What changed in MCP packages and agent skills after people started trusting them · last 30 days · by PulseFeed · MCP Observatory · State of MCP Security
npm i. Existing defences against that are local — a CLI diff you have to run yourself, a runtime proxy inside your own perimeter, or a changelog the vendor writes voluntarily. All of them mean the first victim is never protected.curl -s "https://pulsefeed.dev/mcp/drift.json?packages=pkg-a,pkg-b&days=7"Put it in your CI — one step, no key, fails the build when a dependency you already trust changes dangerously:
- uses: Nikolife2016/mcp-drift-action@v1github.com/Nikolife2016/mcp-drift-action
https://pulsefeed.dev/mcp/drift.rss?packages=pkg-a,pkg-bFull feed: /mcp/drift.json · /mcp/drift.rss · single package:
GET /mcp/verify?package=<name>
Events come from PulseFeed's own daily audit of the MCP package population — npm metadata, install scripts, ownership, provenance, repository, licence and liveness, re-read every night and diffed against the previous snapshot. Series started 2026-08-01. A drift event cannot be reconstructed after the fact: without yesterday's snapshot there is nothing to compare against.
Severity: high — code execution, ownership or source disappeared; medium — attack surface grew or provenance broken; low — informational, including fixes by the author. Window: 30 days · 8553 events · generated 2026-08-21T00:03:33.256Z.
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